Even Marcos wouldn’t want Chinese envoy expelled

IF our diplomatic row with China escalates, that would result in the final push that could send an already fragile Philippine economy over the edge. That would unleash so much outrage that President Marcos would be toppled, just as his father was before his term ends in 2028.

Let’s ignore the pretended, for-the-headlines indignation against the Chinese ambassador of infantile and ignorant senators Erwin Tulfo and Risa Hontiveros as well as of Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, and soberly assess the consequences of kicking the diplomat out of the country.

China’s first response would almost certainly be reciprocal. If Manila expels its ambassador Jing Quan, Beijing could order the Philippine ambassador to leave China. The two governments could subsequently downgrade diplomatic contacts, suspend consultations and reduce cooperation on issues ranging from trade to maritime incidents.

China, however, could respond more forcefully: the Philippines would appear to be the first country in six decades to expel a serving Chinese ambassador—a rare and momentous escalation as Beijing increasingly contests American economic and military primacy.

The comparable recent precedent, but with an important difference, is the China-Canada spat in 2023. Canada in May 2023 when Justin Trudeau was prime minister expelled Chinese consul Zhao Wei, over alleged interference targeting the family of legislator Michael Chong. Beijing denied the allegations and the next day ramped up the response by expelling the consul at Canada’s consulate-general in Shanghai, an important diplomatic post.

Canada in 2024 imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, steel and aluminum and China in 2025 restricted Canadian agricultural and seafood exports. After Prime Minister Trudeau was replaced by Mark Carney in March 2025, high-level contacts resumed and relations between the two countries normalized.

Canada removed a consul, not China’s ambassador. Ordering Jing out of Manila would be a far more serious escalation, in a relationship already burdened by dangerous maritime encounters and far greater Philippine dependence on Chinese trade.

Indonesia

Indonesia expelled two Chinese diplomats in 1967 in the wake of the Suharto-orchestrated massacres of 1965 and 1966, which killed hundreds of thousands of Indonesians alleged to be supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party, and the anti-Chinese frenzy that came with them. Relations between the two countries were normalized only after 23 years, in 1990.

The big difference in Indonesia’s rift with China and ours if it escalates is that the China that Indonesia confronted in 1967 was a poor country and cutting trade with it hardly affected its economy.

Now, China is the largest, or second largest (depending on the metric used), economic superpower today. China’s total trade with the world in 1967 was barely $4 billion. Last year it was $6 trillion. China is the world’s largest goods exporter and second-largest goods importer, behind the United States.

China is one of the Philippines’ largest trading partners and its biggest source of imported goods. It is a major market for Philippine agricultural and industrial products, an important participant in regional manufacturing supply chains, and a potentially significant source of tourists and investment.

Beijing would not have to announce a sweeping economic embargo to hurt the Philippine economy. It could simply tighten inspections of agricultural imports, slow customs clearances, restrict selected commodities, discourage Chinese tourists from visiting the Philippines or postpone economic cooperation projects.

Administrative

Each measure could be defended as a regulatory, commercial or administrative decision. Proving that a particular restriction constituted retaliation would be difficult. Reversing the resulting economic damage could be even harder.

China in the past did apply economic pressure in diplomatic disputes. Its restrictions on Australian commodities during the deterioration of Sino-Australian relations showed how trade could become an instrument of geopolitical confrontation. The restrictions affected products including barley, wine and coal, although their consequences varied considerably across industries and many were subsequently lifted.

During our “Scarborough Stand-off” with China in 2012, China stopped banana imports as they landed on its ports, on the grounds that these needed to be checked for infestations. The bananas rotted, and President Aquino 3rd was more than willing to believe an American diplomat’s claim that Beijing had agreed to withdraw its vessels from the shoal. That was a lie, but it gave Aquino 3rd the excuse to order our vessels out of the area, in effect abandoning the disputed shoal to China.

In 2025 China supplied $38.4 billion worth of goods to the Philippines, representing 28.6 percent of our total merchandise imports. Philippine exports to China amounted to $9.3 billion, or 11 percent of total exports.

Now examine the same trade relationship from Beijing’s perspective. The $38.4 billion in Chinese goods bought by the Philippines in 2025 represented barely one percent of China’s worldwide exports. The $9.3 billion in Philippine goods sold to China amounted to only 0.36 percent of China’s worldwide imports.

Blow

This means that if China were to halt trade with the Philippines, its citizens would hardly notice it. By contrast it could be a body blow to our economy. Go to a supermarket: My estimate is that half or more of the non-perishable goods there are made in China, so are the inexpensive products sold in online stores Lazada and Shopee. In 2023, China even supplied a quarter of our imported petroleum products.

Cut off in a quarrel with China would be goods that sustain factories, construction projects, transportation, agriculture and countless small businesses. China supplies machinery, electronics, industrial components, vehicles and other products indispensable to Philippine economic activity. A serious deterioration in relations could disrupt supply chains, increase costs and discourage investment.

Of course, not all these goods would suddenly disappear if diplomatic relations deteriorated. Trade is conducted almost entirely by private businesses, and Chinese firms also benefit from selling to the Philippine market. But Beijing possesses considerable administrative power over access to its own market, particularly for agricultural exports that require sanitary approvals, customs clearances and other government authorizations.

Economic retaliation is not the only possible consequence. China could intensify its coast guard operations around Bajo de Masinloc and other contested areas, increase patrols, or adopt a less accommodating position in negotiations over maritime incidents.

Such measures would not necessarily be announced as retaliation for the ambassador’s expulsion. Beijing could describe them as revitalized enforcement of its territorial and maritime claims. The Philippines would then confront the familiar difficulty of responding to a much larger power whose coast guard and naval capabilities substantially exceed its own.

Escalation

We should not assume, as our defense secretary seems to firmly believe, that an escalation at sea would produce direct American military intervention. In 2012 President Aquino 3rd went to Washington to beg President Obama to intervene militarily in the Scarborough stand-off. Obama told him to just file a case against China at an international venue, which turned out to be merely with an arbitral panel.

There is a disturbing tendency in Philippine political discourse to equate hostility toward China with patriotism. For the sake of being viewed as committed nationalists, senators and presidential wannabes like the defense secretary compete to issue the harshest statements, while anyone advocating negotiations is accused of weakness or subservience to Beijing.

English writer Samuel Johnson was referring to that kind of scoundrel when he said back in the 18^th century: “Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.” These scoundrels reverse the meaning of patriotism. The obligation of political leaders and bureaucrats is not to demonstrate how loudly they can denounce another country. It is to protect the security, welfare and prosperity of their own people.

For all their pretended patriotism, the likes of Tulfo and Hontiveros, these ignoramuses – or worse, American puppets – want the country to gamble with Filipino livelihoods just for the sake of their grabbing headlines. Shame on these two senators, shame on the Yellows who are trying to build an anti-China frenzy in our country – in the service of the US.

PS: What exactly did the Chinese ambassador say to push the likes of these two ignorant senators and Defense Secretary Teodoro into an anti-China paroxysm? The ambassador made the statement in response to a media query on the sidelines of the second Diliman Dialogue, on his reaction to Teodoro’s characterization of China as the region’s “troublemaker.” Here is his response verbatim:

“That’s nonsense. Who’s the troublemaker? Look at who go after Chinese teachers. They’re innocent. Who led the army to arrest Chinese innocent workers? Who every day smear, attack China? We should feel fortunate enough that you have a neighbor like China in this region. If we want to use force, we may easily win. But no, we will not choose force, and we love peace.”

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Even Marcos wouldn’t want Chinese envoy expelled
Source: Breaking News PH