Iran war shows anti-China stance to be stupid

THE US and Israel’s war against Iran — and the consequent disruption of the Strait of Hormuz — has exposed, in very concrete terms, the utter stupidity of President Marcos Jr.’s belligerent stance toward China, a policy pushed by a small-minded Coast Guard official named Jay Tarriela, US brown-noser Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, and the scheming former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio.

The Strait of Hormuz is the most critical oil chokepoint in the world, with roughly 20 percent of global oil supply passing through it. 

When Iran restricted passage in response to US-Israeli actions, tanker flows dropped sharply, and oil prices surged, with immediate global consequences. The Philippines once again finds itself in a familiar position: highly exposed, yet with very little leverage.

We have no effective channel with Iran. Why would Tehran accommodate us as it did Thailand if we are US puppets, while the Pentagon has brutally bombed its cities and infrastructure and killed its women and children? Our so‑called Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites are to Iran no different from the US bases in Gulf countries that it detests. We also have limited influence in the Gulf and, crucially, strained relations with China, the country that now sits at the center of Middle Eastern energy flows because of its deep commercial ties with both Iran and the Gulf states.

China has built long-term relationships that allow it to navigate supply disruptions and secure energy access even under difficult conditions. The Philippines, by contrast, has spent years moving in the opposite direction. This trajectory began during the Aquino III administration, anchored on the belief that the Philippines could ignore China’s sovereignty claims, assert our rights in the South China Sea, reject any form of joint oil exploration development with Beijing, and rely on “international law” and US backing to enforce its position. Yet the US war against Iran — as well as those against Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Iraq — shows that America routinely spits on international law and merely uses it selectively.

Teodoro, Tarriela and Carpio would have to be total blockheads — or complete US brown-nosers — to still insist that it is China, and not the US, that is the world’s bloody warmonger.

Philex move started it

The belligerent stance toward China crystallized in 2012, when a vessel contracted by Philex Petroleum attempted seismic surveys in Reed Bank even as the company was negotiating a joint exploration agreement with the China National Offshore Oil Corp. Chinese vessels intervened and forced the survey ship to withdraw. Philex is controlled by the Metro Pacific conglomerate, ultimately owned by Indonesian magnate Anthoni Salim. It is indeed tragic that the Philippines got into trouble with China partly because of a foreign tycoon’s ambitions to become an oil producer in Philippine waters.

After that, Aquino III became increasingly hostile. The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) was ordered to arrest Chinese nationals fishing in Scarborough Shoal, which traditionally had been an open fishing area for Chinese, Vietnamese and Filipino fishermen. What angered China was not only photos of PCG personnel armed to the teeth guarding half‑naked Chinese fishermen, but also Aquino’s deployment of the warship BRP Gregorio del Pilar — freshly handed over by the US — to the shoal to assist in the arrests. He belatedly realized that sending a warship meant militarizing the dispute and ordered it out, but by then the damage was done.

The result was a seven‑week standoff as Chinese and Filipino vessels refused to leave, each fearing that withdrawal would mean surrendering sovereignty. The impasse was “resolved” when US assistant state secretary Kurt Campbell fooled our ambassador to the US, Jose Cuisia, and Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario into believing that China had agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal. Aquino ordered our vessels out; China did not. There was no agreement, only a US offer. In effect, the Philippines turned over the shoal to China, as the takeover occurred without the use of force on China’s part.

Fourteen years have passed since 2012. The international law principle of sovereignty through effective control has made it practically impossible for the Philippines to “recover” Scarborough Shoal. In 2024, China even submitted to the United Nations its baselines for the shoal, roughly equivalent to filing the official boundaries of its “property.” The Philippines has not done so. Yet idiots like PCG official Tarriela still insist we can recover Scarborough. We’ve lost it: Blame Aquino III and the US, not China.

With del Rosario — long associated with the Salim conglomerate — as foreign secretary, the government adopted an even harder line. Joint development was rejected, and the dispute was framed in absolutist terms. The expectation may have been that “lawfare” — Carpio’s sacred word — combined with US support, would compel China to accept Philippine exploration of Reed Bank. In practice, it made negotiations impossible.

US objectives

This trajectory aligned with broader US strategic objectives, particularly its effort to demonize China, which it has declared its arch-enemy. A network of policy and research institutions and personalities — such as the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Stratcom, retired US Col. Ray Powell of SeaLight, and, of course, Carpio — played a key role in shaping the Philippine narrative on the South China Sea, emphasizing confrontation and legal framing over pragmatism. Their perspectives filtered into domestic discourse. Officials and commentators adopted a rigid, adversarial approach that left little room for alternative strategies such as joint development or quiet diplomacy.

The consequences are now obvious. As war in the Middle East disrupts energy flows, countries with diversified relationships and open channels are better positioned to respond. Thailand offers a useful counter-example.

When tensions escalated in the Strait of Hormuz, Thailand did not resort to rhetoric or legal posturing. It engaged directly with Iran. Its foreign minister coordinated with Tehran and secured assurances that Thai tankers would be allowed safe passage. The arrangement was straightforward: Thailand signaled that it was not a hostile actor, provided vessel information, and obtained cooperation. This was not “grand strategy”; it was basic diplomacy.

Both Thailand and the Philippines maintain embassies in Tehran. The Philippines has long had a resident mission there. In other words, we have the same formal diplomatic channel that Thailand used. The difference lies not in presence, but in use.

Thailand activated its channel quietly and directly, without ideological baggage. The Philippines, despite having the same access, has not demonstrated the capacity — or political will — to leverage it in moments of crisis. Diplomatic infrastructure is only as effective as the policy guiding it. Thailand also did not rely on China to negotiate on its behalf, nor did it frame the situation in ideological terms. It preserved working relations across multiple fronts — maintaining ties with the United States, China and regional partners — while keeping open channels with countries like Iran. That flexibility allowed it to act when circumstances required.

The Philippines does not have the same room to maneuver. Marcos never ordered our ambassador to Iran, or any official, to talk to Tehran to request that oil meant for us be allowed to pass through Hormuz. This paralysis is not because of geography, but because of choices. By taking a consistently adversarial stance toward China, the Philippines reduced its ability to engage with a key actor in global energy networks. At the same time, it has not developed a habit of activating independent channels with countries like Iran, even when such channels formally exist.

Expectation naive

The expectation that the United States would provide sufficient strategic cover has also proven to be naïve. Even Washington faces constraints in managing the Hormuz situation without risking wider escalation.

The hard numbers make the asymmetry plain. China today consumes roughly 14 to 15 million barrels of oil a day but produces only about 4 million, meaning it imports close to 10 to 11 million barrels daily. About half of those imports — some 4.5 to 5.5 million barrels — come from the Gulf and Iran, much of it passing through Hormuz. Beijing has built large strategic reserves, estimated at 1.5 to 2 billion barrels, enough to cushion disruptions for several months, though even China would be under pressure in a prolonged shutdown.

Precisely because of its scale, however, China has something the Philippines does not have: flexibility. It controls vast supply contracts, diversified sources and logistical networks that allow it to redirect flows in times of crisis. The Philippines, by contrast, consumes only about 400,000 to 500,000 barrels a day — small enough, in fact, to be accommodated within China’s broader system if the political conditions are right.

That is the crucial point. In an extreme emergency — a total closure of Hormuz — it is not inconceivable that China could divert limited volumes or arrange supply channels just to keep Philippine transport and power systems running. The volumes required are modest by global standards. The constraint is not technical or commercial. It is political.

China would naturally prioritize its own needs and those of countries it considers aligned or at least neutral. Oil, in such circumstances, becomes an instrument of statecraft; access depends less on market transactions than on relationships. The issue is not whether China has oil to spare, but whether the Philippines has positioned itself as a country that China would choose to help.

Foreign policy built on rigid positions narrows options over time. A more flexible approach might have preserved room for maneuver: combining assertion of legal claims with pragmatic engagement, including joint development in contested areas; maintaining working relations with major powers across different regions; and keeping multiple channels of engagement open so the Philippines can adapt to shifting conditions.

This government’s anti-China stance is so stupidly unpatriotic.

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Iran war shows anti-China stance to be stupid
Source: Breaking News PH